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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1955
time of the decision, does purport to handle the problem, but since it was
drafted prior to the decision, does not do so very dearly. The new code
expressly states that in a derivative action the plaintiff must allege that he
has sought redress from the directors or was excused from this demand by
the situation.' 7 The comment of the drafting committee states that this
means that an appeal to the shareholders is not necessary.18 If the com-
mittee's interpretation of the statute is to be followed, as it should be, in
the ordinary case where there has been no express ratification, an appeal to
the shareholders is not a prerequisite to a derivative action. But where
there has been an express ratification, the Ckmzan case, which sets forth a
substantive rule, would probably control over the statute, which is phrased
in procedural terms.
HUGH A. Ross
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction
Several cases dealt with jurisdictional matters and the power of the
trial court to maintain the respect for and the dignity of the court.
An interesting question arose concerning the continuing power of the
court of common pleas to commit a delinquent child to the Boys' Industrial
School, upon recommendation of a grand jury, without necessity for an
indictment, under Ohio Revised Code section 5141.16. In reversing an
order of commitment by the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County to which
the case had been transferred by the Juvenile Court of Lucas County, the
Supreme Court held that Ohio Revised Code section 5141.16 is entirely
inconsistent with and necessarily repealed by the subsequently enacted
provisions of Ohio Revised Code sections 2151.25 and 2151.26.1 The
implication from this decision is that the court of common pleas in case
of a referral from the juvenile court, has only the jurisdiction to dispose
of the youth's case which it would have for a like act committed by an adult.
A court of appeals2 decision was concerned with the proper juvenile
court to hear a case of alleged acts of neglect of minor children by an adult.
The appeal was from a decision of the Juvenile Court of Crawford County,
overruling a motion made, on a special appearance, to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that the neglect occurred
in Crawford County. In affirming the order of the lower court, the court
-
T OHo R . CODE § 2307.311.
OFICIA.L COMmEN AND FINA REPoRT OF THE Ono STATE BAR AssN. CORP.
LAw COMMITrEE (1955). The Comment is published in BALDWIN's OHo REV.
CODE ANN. (1955 Supp.).
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of appeals held that the juvenile court of the county in which acts consti-
tuting neglect or dependency of the minor child occur has jurisdiction over
complaints concerning the child. It is therefore immaterial whether the
minor child or parent are nonresidents of the county in which the com-
plaint is filed.
Another court of appeals3 case outlines one of the circumstances, at
least, under which a court of equity may indirectly aid in the enforcement
of the criminal law. While there is a general rule that an injunction will
not lie to prevent or punish the commission of a crime, the court holds that
this rule in no way limits the power of a court of equity to intervene in a
situation where such courts are accustomed to granting permanent or per-
petual injunctions. Thus an action to abate a nuisance under Ohio Revised
Code section 4301.73, declaring any place where intoxicating liquor or
beer is illegally sold or kept to be a common nuisance, may be maintained
in the appropriate court of equity, and it is immaterial that an ensuing
injunction has the incidental affect of restraining the commission of crime.
Since injunction lies to abate such a nuisance, violation of the order may
be punished by contempt proceedings where there is proof of what the
law denominates a nuisance as distinguished from a mere crime.
A per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court,4 adopting the opinion of
the court below, affirmed a court of appeals judgment which had sustained
a judgment of the common pleas court finding persons guilty of contempt
of court for violating an oral order of the trial court against the taking
of any photographs in a forthcoming scheduled court session. The court
of appeals5 had previously declared that the court while in session is under
the complete control of the judge whose directions, reasonably necessary
to maintain order and prevent disturbance and distraction, must be obeyed.
It also rejected any contention that a court in enforcing reasonable court-
room decorum, and prohibiting photographs, interferes with the freedom
of the press, and held the order a reasonable one. It indicated that such
an order enforcing proper court room decorum and directed expressly to
a person in attendance at a judicial proceeding, need not be journalized
to be of full legal effect.
'State v. Worden, 162 Ohio St. 593, 124 N.E.2d 817 (1955). A dissenting opin-
ion by Judge Bell contended that the juvenile judge divested himself of authority to
commit to the correctional school by his act of recognizing to the court of common
pleas, and in effect transferred that authority to the court of common pleas provided
the Grand Jury so recommended, under § 5141.16, REV. CODE, asserting that this
section is not inconsistent with OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2151.25-26.
2In re Belk, 97 Ohio App. 114, 123 N.E.2d 757 (1954).
'State v. Denny's Place, 98 Ohio App. 351, 129 N.E.2d 532 (1954).
' State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954).
'State v. Clifford, 97 Ohio App. 1, 118 N.E.2d 853 (1954).
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Construction of Statutes Defining Crimes
Many statutes defining specific crimes came before the courts for con-
struction during the reported period.
The Supreme Court determined that operation of an automobile to
avoid the prohibitions of Ohio Revised Code section 4511.20 must be in
the same manner as would be followed by a reasonably prudent person
under similar circumstances, and that a person charged with "automobile
homicide" under Ohio Revised Code section 4511.18, to avoid the penalties
of that section, must have so operated his automobile, since section 4511.20
is a law applying to the "use or regulation of traffic.""
The crime of rape and the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of com-
mitting rape (Ohio Revised Code section 2901.31) are not the same
offense, and a conviction of the former cannot be pleaded in a bar of a
prosecution for the latter.7 The court pointed out that it is not necessary
for a conviction of the crime of rape that the state present any evidence of
the kidnapping of the person raped.
When in the course of a prosecution for violation of Ohio Revised
Code section 2901.23 (maliciously shooting at another person with in-
tent ... ) the defendant admits shooting at the prosecuting witness, the
element of malice is presumed from such an intentional act on the part of
the accused.8
An essential element of the case against an accused charged with em-
bezzlement of public funds is that he received public money by virtue of
his office.9
In interpreting Ohio Revised Code section 2949.34, providing for
commitment as an habitual offender a person three times previously con-
victed of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude, one court'0 held that
the offenses of intoxication and driving while intoxicated were not mis-
demeanors involving moral turpitude.
The giving of a postdated check is the delivery of a check within the
meaning of Ohio Revised Code section 115.23, making it a criminal of-
fense to deliver any check with intent to defraud when the drawer at the
time has insufficient funds or credit with the depository on which the
check was drawn."
Ohio Revised Code section 2903.01, defining the crime of assault upon
a child under sixteen by a person over the age of eighteen, was amended
'State v. Martin, 164 Ohio St. 54, 128 N.E.2d 7 (1955).
'State v. Terlecki, 128 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio App. 1952).
State v. Wilson, 127 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio App. 1952).
9State v. Kearns, 127 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Corn. P1. 1955).
'State v. Deer, 129 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
' State v. DeNicola, 163 Ohio St. 140, 126 N.E.2d 62 (1955).
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effective January 1, 1946, by the elimination of -the word "female" from
the phraseology describing the victim of the assault. This was held to
constitute an enlargement of the scope of the offense, and an indictment
was held good' 2 which charged the defendant with an assault upon a male
child under the age of sixteen.
Ohio Revised Code section 2145.41, defining the offense of "tending
to cause delinquency" in a child was sustained against a charge of voidness
for uncer-tainty.' 3 The court of appeals held that this statute describes
-the offense with reasonable certainty, and concluded that a lack of uni-
formity among courts in the construction of the statute does not render the
statute void for lack of uniform operation.
Ohio Revised Code section 4549.05 forbids the malicious removal
without consent of the owner of enumerated parts and portions of an
automobile, and in conclusion further prohibits the removal of "any other
appurtenance or any part attached to said motor vehicle which is necessary
in" its use. The court of appeals' 4 held that the quoted phraseology was
not limited to a similar device to those enumerated before, and that it
includes any object vitally necessary to the operation of the automobile,
including the keys to the ignition and gas tank. Therefore an affidavit
charging removal of such keys charged an offense under the statute.' 5
One court of appeals' 6 held that an injunction was improperly granted
against the seizure and confiscation of certain pinball machines. These
machines all granted the customer a right to replay without charge upon the
attaining of a set score. Such a machine is a gambling device within the
meaning of Ohio Revised Code sections 2915.04 and 2915.15.
Another court of appeals decision held that the word "whoever" in a
municipal ordinance prohibiting games of chance referred only to natural
persons and corporations and that an unincorported association could not
be charged with the offense of operating a game of change - bingo.17
The court also discussed the comparable language of Ohio Revised
Code section 2915.19, with the implication that the word "whoever" used
therein should be similarly construed.18
"EState v. Rudy, 162 Ohio St. 362, 123 N.E.2d 426 (1954).
" State v. Coterel, 97 Ohio App. 48, 123 N.E.2d 438 (1953).
"'City of Cleveland Heights v. Friedman, 127 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio App. 1955).
'" OHIO REv. CODE § 4549.05.
"Westerhaus, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 127 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio App. 1955), re-
hearing and motion to certify on ground of conflict denied, 128 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio
App. 1955).
" Village of Bridgeport v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 97 Ohio App. 245, 125 N.E.2d
202 (1954).
"OHIO REv. CODE § 1.02 (A) gives a general definition of the word "whoever,"
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Arrest
While the issue arose in a civil action for damages for false arrest and
imprisonment, the decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Reddy19
has several important implications relative to criminal procedure. The
main question presented by the case involves the extent to which a police
officer in one community may rely upon the statements and requests of an
officer in another community or another state concerning the arrest of a
person sought by the latter. The specific case was presented by a person
who was thought to be wanted by the police of another state and therefore
called for a construction of Ohio Revised Code section 2963.12 of the
Uniform Extradition Act. Identical problems could arise from requests
originating within the state of Ohio and be presented under Ohio Re-
vised Code sections 2935.04 and 2935.05. Two conclusions may be
drawn from the decision: (1) Where a police office makes an arrest
without a warrant at the request of another police agency, all reasonable
doubts concerning the reasonableness of the information on which the
arresting officer acts should be resolved in his favor. (2) When the police
agency of another state requests an investigation of a person by a police
agency of Ohio which request identifies the subject in major details and,
after investigation and report to it, requests the arrest of the person in-
vestigated, the officer making the arrest without a warrant does so upon
reasonable information and is not liable in tort if the detention subsequently
turns out to be unwarrranted.
Extradition
The one case2° in this field presented two conclusions: (1) A petition
for extradition filed with the governor of the demanding state which com-
plies with neither the law of the demanding state nor Ohio but which
complies with the requirements of the federal statute, is sufficient. (2)
Ohio Revised Code section 2963.17 vesting discretion in the Governor of
Ohio to surrender or hold for trial one who has been charged with crime in
this state is for the benefit of the State of Ohio and not the fugitive who
and it includes "all persons, natural and artificial; partners; principles, agents, and
employees; and all officials, public or private."
It would appear that a proper method of charging violations of the gambling laws
by unincorporated associations would be by naming the managers or officials and the
agents who actually participated in the operation of the device or devices as the
defendants.
"9163 Ohio St. 347, 126 N.E.2d 911 (1955).
'State v. Smith, 127 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio App. 1953).
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cannot be prejudiced by any error which might have been committed by
the governor in this respect.
Bail
Two court of appeals decisions were concerned with the jurisdiction of
that court to admit to bail a person convicted of second degree murder,
pending decision of the court upon final hearing. In State v. Hawkins2
the court was of the opinion that the punishment of one convicted of mur-
der in the second degree is not imprisonment for life but that such im-
prisonment is only until legally released.2 2  The court recognized that
there may be some confusion and contradictions in the several statutes
involving sentences, sentencing and parole, but concluded that any am-
biguities and contradictions must be resolved most favorably to the im-
prisoned person, holding that the statutory provisions for suspension of
execution and admission to bail rest in the sound discretion of the judge in
the light of all the facts presented and the administration of justice, a strong
consideration "being that an accused should not suffer the penalty for crime
until by the due process of law it is determined that he has had a fair trial
free from prejudicial error," and admitting the defendant to bail.
The other decision denied bail to a person convicted of second degree
murder, pending an appeal on questions of law.2 3 Relying on the pro-
visions of Ohio Revised Code section 2949.02, the court held that the
statutory law of Ohio prohibits either the trial court or the reviewing court
to which an appeal is taken from extending the privilege of bail to one
convicted of second degree murder pending appeal. It did not feel that
the provisions of Revised Code section 5145.01, prohibiting a trial court
from fixing the duration or limits of a sentence to the penitentiary of one
convicted of a felony, with two exceptions, were applicable to the specific
problem.
There appear to be conflicts in the provisions of the various statutes
applicable to the problem of admission to bail after conviction of second
degree murder, and there is sharp conflict in the decisions of these two
courts as to the discretionary power to admit the convicted person to bail
pending the appeal.
2197 Ohio App. 477, 124 N.E.2d 453 (1954).
2OHIo REv. CODE § 5145.01 provides that the court in imposing sentence for fel-
onies, except treason and murder in the first degree, shall make such sentences gen-
eral and not fixed or limited in their duration, with all terms of imprisonment in
the penitentiary being ended in the manner provided by law (meaning, the law
governing paroles and releases).
' State v. Sheppard, 97 Ohio App. 489, 123 N.E.2d 544 (1955).
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Affidavits, Indictments, Informations
Two court of appeals decisions were concerned with minor problems ot
pleading to an affidavit. One such problem concerned the proper method
of attacking a factual variance in the affidavit. When the affidavit charged
operation by a gasoline engine powered truck, and the evidence showed
an oil burning engine, and the mode of attack was a demurrer, the de-
murrer was overruled. While the affidavit would have been subject to a
motion to quash, the demurrer did not reach the claimed defect because
the affidavit as a whole continued to charge the same thing 2 4 The other
case involved the mechanics of amending an affidavit. The affidavit had
been amended in the lower court without verification by the individuals
preferring the charges. This was held to be an unauthorized act inasmuch
as there is no provision in the Ohio statutes for the amendment of an
affidavit.2 In effect the court says that the only way to secure the affect
of an amendment, is to file a new verified affidavit in the form required.
One trial court opinion discussed the necessary allegations of an indict-
ment for embezzlement to stand against a demurrer, and upheld a de-
murrer because the indictment failed to allege the official capacity of the
defendant and his receipt of the money in question by virtue of his office 20
Subsequently another indictment was prepared charging the official char-
acter of the accused and receipt of public moneys, using very largely the
statutory definition. This was supplemented on motion of the defendant
for a bill of particulars, and the indictment was sustained against a de-
murrer.
27
Consolidation of offenses charged by separate indictments rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court, and it was held not error to order
consolidation for trial of the offense of trespass and that of damaging a
fence 28
Will evidence be received to vitiate an indictment? This question was
raised by a plea in abatement, presenting the assertion that there was no
competent evidence before the grand jury. The plea was overruled20
"City of Cleveland v. Antonio, 124 NXE.2d 846 (Ohio App. 1955). The court in-
dicates that a motion to quash would be an accepted method of attack, and cited
OHIo REv. Conn § 2941.59, to the effect that accused waived the varience by filing
his demurrer.
'City of Ironton v. Bundy, 129 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio App. 1954). The court reasons
that criminal procedure is statutory, and, in the absence of statutory authority to
amend an affidavit, no such authority exists. Statutory authority does exist for the
amendment of indictments and informations. OHno REv. CODE § 2941.30.
'State v. Kearns, 127 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
'State v. Kearns, 129 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio Com. P. 1955).
State v. Brown 128 N.E.2d 179 (Ohio App. 1954).
' State v. Selby, 126 N.E.2d 606 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1955).
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with the comment that an indictment of the grand jury regular upon its
face is conclusively presumed to have in its support sufficient evidence to
justify the action of the grand jury. The accused is not entitled to know
the evidence before the grand jury.
The case of State v. Kearns3" was before the trial court on another
intermediate matter, namely the right of the defendant to have a bill of
particulars. The court strongly affirmed the right of the defendant to have
a bill of particulars under Revised Code section 2941.07. This bill must
contain something over and above the mere essentials of the averments
necessary to state an offense, and the defendant is entitled to a statement
of the ultimate facts upon which the state expects to rely in establishing
its case, and the state is limited in its proof to the indictment and the mat-
ters specified in the bill.
Pre-trial Inspection of State's Written Evidence
In State v. Potts3l the trial court denied defendant's motion to inspect
any written matter or other evidence that the prosecutor had and expected
to use in the trial. This motion was directed toward the procuring of a
confession for inspection prior to trial. It was held that defendant was
not entitled to such inspection.3 2
Trial Proceedings
General
The decision of the court of appeals includes the rulings on the more
than a score of alleged trial errors in the celebrated Sheppard case.3 3 Dis-
cussion of these various rulings will be omitted, however, from this article
because of the pending appeal in the Supreme Court of Ohio.
3 4
2'126 N.E.2d 607 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
- 124 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio App. 1953).
' The court of appeals relied upon the decision in State v. Yeoman, 112 Ohio St.
214, 147 N.E. 3 (1925), wherein the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor could
not be compelled to submit documentary evidence prior to trial. That court found
that OHIO REv. CODE § 2317.33 (O.G.C. § 11552) requiring inspection and copy
applied only to civil proceedings, and that REy. CODE § 2945.46 (O.G.C. §
13444-6) made civil procedure applicable to criminal procedure only with reference
to compelling the attendance and testimony of witnesses, their examination, the ad-
ministering of oaths and affirmations, and proceedings for contempt to enforce the
remedies and protect the rights of parties.
'State v. Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d 471 (Ohio App. 1955).
1 29 OHIo BAR 35 (1956). The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal (January
11, 1956). On the same day the Court ordered the dismissal of the appeal as a mat-
ter of right for want of any debatable constitutional question. State v. Sheppard,
164 Ohio St. 428 (1956).
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It is clear that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio has
authority to assign any judge of the court of common pleas to any county
to hold court therein. In addition to this authority by assignment, the
court of appeals35 has held that the constitution vests a common pleas
judge with authority to preside in each and every county in the state, and
that this is self-executing. Therefore, a common pleas judge presiding in
a county other than the one in which he was elected or appointed acts in
a de jure capacity, even without formal assignment by the Chief Justice.
Pleas
Two decisions involved the affect of pleading in a particular manner.
In State v. EvolW 6 the defendants had been granted the privilege of with-
drawing their pleas of guilty and re-entering pleas of not guilty, these
having been journalized. It was held that the trial court lacked authority
to vacate this journal entry and restore prior pleas of guilty without the
consent of the defendants made in open court. In the other case37 it was
held that a plea of "guilty to homicide generally" is synonymous with a
plea of guilty to murder vesting the trial judge with authority to hear the
cause and pronounce sentence without the necessity of a formal waiver of
jury trial by the defendant. The plea of guilty waives the right to a jury
trial. The application for a writ of habeas corpus was accordingly denied.
The Public's Right to a Public Trial in Criminal Cases
The unusual case of E. W1. Scripps Co. v. Falton38 decided several very
novel questions. The defendant in a felony prosecution had requested that
the public be excluded from the trial. This request was granted, and all
members of the public including the press were excluded for the duration
of the trial of the case of State v. Baker (the felony prosecution). The
issue for the public was raised by an original action in prohibition in the
court of appeals. The court of appeals held that the relators as members of
the public had a right to maintain the action. On the merits the court held
that Article 1, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution does not guarantee the
eState v. Powers, 129 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio App. 1954).
'State v. Evola, 130 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App. 1955).
' State v. Eckle, 130 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio App. 1954).
1 125 N.E.2d 896 (Ohio App. 1955). The court distinguished its holding in State
v. Clifford, 97 Ohio App. 1, 118 N.E.2d 853 (1954), and the following quotation is
relevant: "The judge in exercising his complete control of the proceedings may
exclude those whose conduct is of a disturbing nature, or whose presence is likely to
interfere with the administration of justice as well as making such orders of exclu-
sion as will protect the public health, the public morals and the public safety. With
these limitations it is the duty of the trial judge to afford both the state and the de-
fendant a trial in 'open court."'
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defendant a private trial as against the public and that the defendant
cannot by a written waiver of public trial secure a trial hidden from public
view. Finally, under the circumstances of this case, total exclusion at the
request of the defendant was without legal foundation; under such cir-
cumstances it is the duty of the trial judge to afford both the state and the
defendant a trial in "open court."
Judicial Comment During the Trial
Two cases dealt with the propriety of comment by the trial judge dur-
ing the course of the trial. In State v. Lawrence39 the trial court repeatedly
interrupted defense counsel while conducting the direct examination of
his witnesses in a trial before the judge without a jury. The Supreme
Court determined that the entire atmosphere of the trial as shown by the
record fell far short of the requirements of the law and ordered a retrial.
In the other case4" the jury returned to the court room and asked the
trial judge to summarize the testimony of a witness on a specific point. The
trial judge gave his recollection of the testimony orally in response to the
question. It was held that the trial judge has such power to summarize at
the request of the jury in a criminal case. Also in this case the trial judge
discovered that he had submitted an incorrect form of a guilty verdict at
the time the jury retired. Upon discovery of this mistake he substituted
a corrected form. This was held proper.
Scope of Cross Examination
One case4 ' illustrates the extreme importance of allowing the greatest
breadth in the defense cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecu-
tion. The accused was being tried for unarmed robbery, and the victim
and the accused were the only direct witnesses to the circumstances sur-
rounding defendant's possession of the article allegedly stolen. The record
showed a consistency of ruling against efforts of defense counsel to impeach
the credibility of the prosecuting witness. It was held that this was a denial
of the right of full and fair cross examination. The questions asked and
refused were directed toward determining the witness's habits of sobriety,
condition of sobriety at the time of alleged robbery, mental health, associa-
tions, similar accusations and habits in general. These were all considered
'State v. Lawrence, 162 Ohio St. 412, 123 N.E.2d 271 (1954). The concurring
opinion of Judge Lamneck has this comment: "It is not proper for a court, in a
criminal case, to intervene when counsel is examining a witness on direct examina-
tion and before such direct examination has been concluded to cross-examine such
witness on the assumption he is not telling the truth."
'°State v. Kollar, 128 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio App. 1952). OHiO REV. CODE 5 2315.06
so provides in the Code of Civil Procedure, but the rule in the principal case is de-
rived from judicial precedent.
"
1State v. Browning, 98 Ohio App. 8, 128 N.E.2d 173 (1954).
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pertinent as reflecting on his credibility, and the questions should have
been permitted.
Bill of Exceptions
A court of appeals decision was concerned with whether a post-trial
document, namely a pre-sentence probation department report, should
be made a part of the bill of exceptions. It was held that there was no
legal right to have the report made a part of the bill 4 2 where it had not been
introduced in evidence.
Evidence
It is competent as a rule to show the refusal of the defendant to submit
to intoxication tests 3 This becomes very important in traffic code viola-
tions where the charge is driving while intoxicated or while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The Supreme Court has held, however,
that comment on this refusal is improper where the defendant has refused
to submit unless his own physician is present at the examination when
there is no showing that physician is unavailable, the refusal being a
reasonable one.44
State v. Gordon45 applied the rule that error in the admission of evi-
dence is not ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears that the ad-
mission of such evidence prejudiced the defendant.
Another court of appeals decision40 applied the rule that a person can-
not be convicted of an offense on circumstantial evidence unless the cir-
cumstances are inconsistent with innocence; the circumstances must be
proved and must all point in the same direction, and together must be ir-
reconcilable with any reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilty.
Instructions
Ohio Revised Code section 2945.83 (D) prohibits reversal for a mis-
direction of the jury unless the accused was or may have been prejudiced
thereby. This rule was observed in a case involving the procurement of
credit by giving false statements wherein the jury found the value to be
$250 where the judge had read the former statute which called for a smaller
amount but which was in other respects the same as the law subsequent
to the amendment 47 increasing the minimum amount for a felony.
" State v. Weed, 129 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio App. 1954).
"City of Columbus v. Waters, 124 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1954), on appeal
from a conviction in Municipal Court.
"City of Columbus v. Mullins, 162 Ohio St. 419, 123 N.E.2d 422 (1954).
'=124 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio App. 1955).
City of Cleveland v. Coleman, 127 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio App. 1955).
'7 State v. Kollar, 128 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio App. 1952).
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Where the court was not requested to give any charges before argu-
ment, or to give additional charges at the close of the general charge, it
may not be charged with error for any omission48 it may inadvertently
make.
State v. George 9 raised a question concerning the time at which the
requested charges should be given. It was held that the only requirement
of the law is that the general charge fully and completely instruct the jury
as to the law applicable to the evidence presented. There is no mandatory
duty upon the court to give any instruction to the jury before argument in
criminal cases. Also it is not error to refuse to give the special requests of
a defendant where the court instructed the jury on the subject matter con-
mined in the special requests in its general charge.
A court of appeals case enforced the familiar rule that the trial court
must charge on the lesser included offenses under a charge of first degree
murder and also on self-defense and accidental homicide where there is
evidence on these issues.50
Several questions relative to instructions on the matter of punishment
were raised in State v. Meyer5l wherein the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder without recommendation of mercy. The trial court
had failed to charge that in determining the question of guilt the jury
should not consider punishment but that punishment rests with the judge,
except as to first degre murder, but there had been no request to charge
on this point. Also the trial court may have committed a technical error
in explaining in some detail the function and power of the executive de-
partment in modifying punishment by pardon or commutation and parole
and in answering the jury's question relative to eligibility for parole of one
convicted of second degree murder, but the Supreme Court felt that there
was nothing prejudicial in this requiring a reversal.
Sentence
Accused was convicted after pleading not guilty by reason of in-
sanity and then being committed to Lima State Hospital and reported back
as sane, on his plea of guilty to a violation of Revised Code section 2303.01.
He was then immediately sentenced to the Ohio Penitentiary, without the
reference required by Ohio Revised Code section 2947.25 which states that
the trial court "must" refer such a person for psychiatric examination where
convicted of violating a number of statutes, including section 2903.01. On
'State v. Brown, 128 N.E.2d 179 (Ohio App. 1954).
' 128 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio App. 1953).
m State v. Bednarik, 126 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio App. 1955).
163 Ohio St. 279, 126 N.E.2d 585 (1955). Two of the judges dissented on the
question of prejudice in the matter of the charge on punishment.
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an original writ of habeas corpus the court of appeals52 held that the refer-
ence for psychiatric treatment after conviction and before sentence is
mandatory and that the court is without jurisdiction to sentence until this
has been done.
Criminal Appeals
Under Ohio Revised Code section 2953.05 an appeal may be filed after
30 days from sentence and judgment only by leave of the court or two of
the judges thereof. It is necessary that a defendant make a showing of cleat
right for leave to appeal before it will be granted. In the absence of such
showing the application will be denied. The court has the widest discretion
in granting or refusing the appeal.5 3
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the writ of habeas corpus
cannot be substituted for the appeal where the committing court had juris-
diction of the subject matter and the person.54
State v. Benarik,55 previously discussed as to its merits under the topic
of instructions, is one of those rare cases in which leave to appeal has been
granted. The verdict was returned in this case on March 18, 1947. In
1953 defendant was unsuccessful before the Supreme Court in an original
writ of habeas corpus, and his successful petition for leave to appeal was
filed on January 22, 1954, after several previously unsuccessful applica-
tions for leave to appeal had been overruled.
In State v. Sheppard56 the court of appeals denied a motion to certify
its decision denyifig an application for bail because the order refusing bail
pending trial on the merits is interlocutory in character and cannot be re-
viewed by direct appeal.
'When the court of appeals determines that a verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, the Supreme Court is not required to and ordinarily
In re Henry, 97 Ohio App. 64, 123 N.E.2d 672 (1954). The judgment of the
court discharged the petitioner from the custody of the prison warden and delivered
him to the custody of the sheriff of Hamilton County with directions to return him
to the court of common pleas for further proceedings according to law. This judg-
ment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Henry, 162 Ohio St. 62, 120
N.E.2d 588 (1954). It agreed that the conviction was lawful but the sentence
void, and therefore the petitioner was not entitled to absolute freedom.
'State v. Kramer, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 127 N.E.2d 61 (1953). See also Poppa v.
Wanamaker, 129 N.E.2d 764, 767 (Ohio App. 1954).
'In re Kramer, 163 Ohio St. 510, 127 N.E.2d 367 (1955); Bednarik v. State, 159
Ohio St. 596, 112 N.E.2d 817 (1953).
'State v. Bednarik, 123 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio App. 1954). The defendant had failed
to file notice of appeal in the trial court and with the prosecutor as required by law,
so the court of appeals granted defendant leave to amend his motion for leave to ap-
peal by complying with OHIo REv. CODE § 2953.05 and 2953.06.
r97 Ohio App. 493, 124 N.E.2d 730 (1955).
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